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THE ORTHODOX IN THE RUSSIAN ULTRANATIONALIST MOVEMENTS
by Alexander Verkhovsky
Alexander Markovich Verkhovsky is Vice-President of the Information
and Research Center PANORAMA located in Moscow
(www.panorama.ru). The paper was presented at a panel on The
Religious Factor in Contemporary Russian Ultranationalism at the
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies convention
in Washington DC in November 2001.
One should not be surprised that Orthodoxy shows a religious preference for
radical-nationalist movements. Yet Orthodoxy does not dominate the movement
unconditionally. On the one hand, there is the strong position of the neopagans (cf. the
speech by Vladimir Pribylovskii, "Neopagan Clamour in Russian Nationalism") that is
linked to the neopaganism of German Nazism, as well as with the search for national
identity in the face of a "too Jewish" Christianity. On the other hand, Russian society is
not very religious in the traditional sense of that word. One could just as well say, that
some sort of vague religiosity is dominant, a mixture of elements from Orthodoxy, other
religions, astrology, and other para-religious teachings.1 Obviously, all of this has a
bearing on the radical-nationalist movement.
Therefore the specter of the return of "church or secular self-determination",
"Orthodoxy or paganism" viewpoints is more than fully met. We have already written
about this earlier,2 and the situation has not changed fundamentally during the most
recent period.

Russian National Union (RNU) - Semi-Orthodox
1

See the interesting comments in Alexander Shchipkov, Vo chto verit Rossia [In W hat Does Russia
Believe?], St. Petersburg, RKhGI Isdatel’stvo, 1998.

2

Alexander Verkhovsky, “Tzerkov v politike i politika v tserkvi” [Church in Politics and Politics in the
Church] in Politicheskaiia ksenofobiia [Political Xenophobia], Moscow, OOO Panorama, 1999, 101-107;
Alexander Verkhovsky, “Ultra-Nationalists in Russia at the Onset of Putin’s Rule”, Nationality Papers,
Vol. 28, no. 4, (December 2000), 707-722.
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The largest radical nationalist organization in the country, the Russian National
Union (RNU) split in the autumn of 2000. There now exist four relatively large and
independent fragments of the RNU. In none of these did any information surface about
a change in religious orientation. Obviously, all four parts of the RNU remain formally
Orthodox.
Nevertheless, the program documents of the RNU lack the demand - very
widespread in Russian political programs - for a strengthened role for the Russian
Orthodox Church, a feature that signifies a notable bad will toward the latter. That should
not really be surprising. The Moscow Patriarchate is loyal to the authorities, whereas the
RNU is radically opposed to them. Not long ago the Patriarch himself formally judged
the RNU to be a non-Orthodox movement.3
Further, the RNU confesses Orthodoxy in its own fashion. As stated in its current
programme: "Members of the RNU conform their lives to a more ancient, medieval form
of Orthodoxy, which served our forebears as spiritual basis for the formation and
strengthening of the Russian government.”4 Such forms of Orthodoxy the RNU
determine themselves, for which they are regarded indeed as Orthodox nationalists.5
From a churchly and canonic point of view, the RNU groups are without question
non-Orthodox, but that has not hindered them from having positive contacts to clerics
of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Recently, on August 5, 2001, on the 10th
anniversary of the return of the relics of Saint Serafim of Sarov, the Diveevo Monastery
provided camping facilities for about 150 Barkashovtsy.
What Matters More - Orthodoxy or Nationalism?
It is impossible to sort out the organizations according to such precisely
formulated criteria. There are of course those, for whom the answer is obvious: for the

3

“Sviatoi krest ili svastika?”, [Holy Cross or Swastika?] Moskovskii Tserkovnyi vestnik, No. 10, 1994.

4

“Chto takoe RNE”. [W hat is RNU?] cited from http://www.rne.faithweb.com/teos.htm

5

See for example, Georgii Aleksandrov, “Chevo boitsia Barkashov?” [W hat is Barkashov Afraid of?]
Russkii pravoslavnyi patriot, No. 1, 1999.
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RNU nationalism is more important, and for the "Radonezh" society, Orthodoxy matters
more. One can designate those also, for whom the question has not yet been decided,
which leads to specific consequences.
Take for example the fully Orthodox Russian All-National Union (RANU) of
Igor Artemov. Yet RANU considers itself as a secular, not a churchly organization.
RANU is not well known, but at the parliamentary election in 1999 Artemov made a
respectable political showing - he alone among the national-radicals did not boycott the
elections. In his voting district in Vladimir Oblast he gained nearly 15% of the votes,
which far exceeded the gains of other radical-nationalist candidates (who took only 1-3
%, or even less). He was only 1.6% behind the winner, Then in 2001 Artemov became
a deputy of the legislative assembly in Vladimir Oblast.
Another example - the Orthodox monarchist celibate priest Nikon (Belavenets),
raised to that rank by the Patriarch as recently as the beginning of 2000, continues to
work closely with activists who are avowedly non-Orthodox, is close to the “New Right”,
to anarchists and skinheads. If however, Father Nikon is known for his very unusual
behavior, far less easily explained is the fact that Leonid Simonovich, chair of the Union
of Orthodox Brotherhoods gave a speech at a meeting organized on August 17, 2001 by
the party of anarchists and rock musicians surrounding the Nazi-like sect of Sergei
“Spider” Troitsky.6
Such are the extremes in researching the combinations of nationalism and
orthodoxy. Then there is also the main stream with its longer established formula for
combining nationalism and orthodoxy.

Russian Orthodox Fundamentalism
This formula, of course, exists in a variety of modifications. But in its essence it
consists of the claim that the Russian “Orthodox Nation” (usually including Ukrainians

6

“Pravoslavnyie khorugvenostsy ob’edinilis’ s anarkhistami I rokerami” [Orthodox Bannerbearers United
w i t h
A n a r c h i s t s
a n d
B i k e r s ]
N T V ,
R u . 2 0 . 0 8 . 2 0 0 1
(http://txt.ntv.ru/religy/20Aug2001/spkhorugv_print.html)
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and Belorussians), is the bearer of the true faith (most probably meaning the one and
only). Therefore even its enemies simultaneously intermix ethnic and religious
terminology. Here in principle, the question of faith stands above the question of
ethnicity, but at the same time the latter also supercedes (pogloshaet) it - a contradiction.
Given a political understanding of the utility of contradictions, this makes it so much
easier to fashion a product out of religious underpinnings.
Russian Orthodox fundamentalism (hereafter - fundamentalism) relies on the
notion of a “golden age”, to which one must return - a return to a pre-revolutionary (pre
1905) Russian Empire. It proposes its restoration in all its basic features - full fledged
autocracy, restrictions for foreign believers and (in part) for foreigners, the imperial
structure for internal and external policy, a ruling status for the ROC, and a rigorous
state-Orthodox paternalism.
Konstantin Dushenov, who is one of the best theoreticians of fundamentalism,
though not the most influential, stated these views concisely. Dushenov, editor in chief
of the periodical Orthodox Russia (Rus’ Pravoslavnaia) and formerly secretary to
Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg & Ladoga, (who can rightly be regarded as spiritual
leader for the forming of fundamentalism7), labeled his programme the “Doctrine of
Metropolitan Ioann”. The opening lines of the programme are sufficiently substantive:
“The Russian Idea” - it is the tireless striving for holiness, justice and purity.
“Orthodox State” - it is a state, based on the highest truths of the Law of God
[i.e. Scripture].
“Russian Democracy” - that is ‘sobornost’.
“Russian Ideology” - that is Orthodoxy.
“Russian Imperialism” - that is ‘derzhavnost’ (power).

7

Metropolitan Ioann died November 2, 1995 and among the bishops of the ROC they have not found an
adequate successor, though they could mention Met. Gedeon (Dokushin), Archbishop Iuvenali (Tarasov),
Archbishop Tikhon (Emel’ianov), Bishop Veniamin (Pushkaria), Bishop Antonii (Masendich, who died
July 8, 2001).
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“Russian State” - that is Russia in all its manifold historical forms of statehood.8
There do exist a number of organizations, which to a very high degree of
faithfulness and radicality embody these positions. In the first place are the Orthodox
brotherhoods, among whom the society “Radonezh” (thanks in part to its radio station
and newspaper) plays a basic role. Then follow the Union of “Christian Revival” (UCR),
the Union of Orthodox Bannerbearers [Khorugvennostsev] (UOBB), Black Hundreds
and others (more details see Stella Rock, “Militant Piety’: Fundamentalist Tendencies
in the Russian Orthodox Brotherhood Movement”, pp1-17 in this issue).
Here is a citation from the text of Anatolii Makeeva, Elder of the St. Joseph of
Volotsk Brotherhood. This text can be considered quintessential radical fundamentalism,
since it reveals all the themes that preoccupied fundamentalists at the end of the 1990s
(on changes in recent years, see below).
“Children, the Devil has conspired against our long-suffering fatherland.
Greedy foreign hordes pillage and destroy our lands, our people. With the help
of the authorities, numerous sorcerers, witches, sectarians and heretics corrupt and
destroy the soul of the Russian people.
The mongrel-democratic government is moving toward the elimination of the line
“nationality” in our passports, is preparing to erase the Russian national past, that
which remains of it - its home.
Cosy cosmopolitans, with the help of global elites, are usurping power in our
country through fickle and traitorous means. Rootless democrats are trying to plunder
and sell as worthless our source of food - the land.
Having lost their Russian nationality, their Russian land, the Russian people are
losing their Orthodox faith and become easy prey for the New World Order. Instead of
the Christian Orthodox Church stands the ecumenical church or Antichrist.”9
8

Konstantin Dushenov, concluding essay to the collection Problemy sovrem ennoi Rossii glazam i russkikh
arkhiereev [Problems of Contemporary Russia in the Eyes of Russian Bishops] St. Petersburg, 1996.

9

Anatolii Makeev, “Brat’ia i sestry!” (Brothers and Sisters!) Shturm ovik, December 8-18, 1997 (W ith
retention of original punctuation).
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Mutual Relations Between Fundamentalists and Communists as Problem
Fundamentalism in contemporary Russia is still quite marginal. Meanwhile
Orthodox national-radicals strive as before for inclusion in major politics.
Understandably, for some of them, political success comes before ideological purity.
Those who are ready for compromise are immediately confronted with the problem of
what compromises to accept to join with the communists, as the basic anti-liberal
opposition force. For the Orthodox in general, and for the nationalists in particular, a
relationship to the communists is naturally quite undesirable.
Those organizations, for whom their orthodoxy plays a secondary role, do not
oppose creating a Bloc with the communists (for example, Russian Party (Russkaia
partiia), All-Russian Conciliar Movement (Vserossiskoie sobornoe dvizhenie). It is a
different matter for the fundamentalists.
The first aggravation of the problem came in the presidential election of 1996,
when the choice was between Boris Yeltsin and Gennadi Zyuganov. At the time only a
small group of fundamentalists headed by archpriest Alexander Shargunov openly
established a union with Zyuganov, for which they garnered abuse from other
fundamentalists and from the Patriarch.
Though Yeltsin was a quite unacceptable figure, Konstantin Dushenov was
prepared to establish a Bloc with him sooner, than with the communists. Immediately
after the election he put forth a serious proposal to make the Russian Orthodox Church
the motor of a new state ideology, as alternative to the ‘old’ ideology - ‘red’ or ‘white’.10
But the rapprochement between the Kremlin and the ROC remained at an extremely
limited level.
Then for the partliamentary elections of 1999 Dushenov seemed ripe for a union
with the communists. The resultant declaration11 was signed by Dushanov together with

10

Konstantin Dushenov, “Soiuz nerushumyi Kremlia i ... Kresta?” [Union of the inviolable Kremlin and
... Cross?] Sovetskaia Rossiia, July 6, 1996.

11

“Vremia sobirat’ kamni” [Time to gather stones] Rus’ Pravoslavnaia, No. 8, 1999.
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a number of other fundmentalist activists, including the chief editor of the news agency
Russian Line (Russkaia liniia) Sergei Grigor’ev, the editor in chief of the almanac
Orthodoxy or Death (Pravoslavie ili smert ) Andrei Riumin and others. The authors
affirmed, that Zyuganov’s National-Patriotic Union of Russia (NPUR) and the
“communo-patriotic bloc” named Victory (Pobeda), as proposed by the communist
general Valentin Varennikov were not simply a tactical union, the “lesser evil” in
comparison with the parties of the “Yeltsin regime”, but were a union, ideologically
sufficiently compatible to publicize the idea of “Russian Orthodox socialism”. This was
the terminology of Dushenov, of course, not of Varennikov or Zyuganov, though one
must recognize, that the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] in fact had
completed a serious evolution into an “orthodox-patriotic” ideology.
In this declaration the fundamentalists employed precisely this argument for
forming a union with the communists - only a friendly power could help the
fundamentalists triumph over their opponents within the church itself.
At the time, nevertheless, the “zealots for Orthodox piety” (now the selfdesignation of the Dushenov circle) did not slip into the electoral lists of the Zyuganov
Bloc - the CPRF did not find it necessary to share seats with the minority in their union.
Nor did a more radical variant of the communist-patriotic bloc come about, which some
zealots planned to establish around General Albert Makashova, who was known for his
extremism. Hegumen Aleksei (Prosvirin), editor in chief of the journal Zealot for
Orthodox Piety (Revnitel’ pravoslavnogo blagochestiia) and member of the board of
editors of Orthodox Rus’ (Rus’ Pravoslavnaia), expressed full solidarity with Albert
Makashov during the height of the scandal surrounding Makashov’s antisemitic
statements at the end of 1998. In Hegumen Aleksei’s opinion, the word of the Apostle
Paul that “in Christ there is neither Greek nor Jew”, that word is “not for all of us,
sinners”. So in terms of a political ideology both then can be included under the term
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“Orthodox Stalinism”.12
In other words, in the majority of cases many fundamentalists were ready to
renounce their anticommunism, but their concessions showed it was not necessary. Those
who participated in the non-communist opposition bloc also did not succeed. Only the
Union of “Christian Revival” (Khristianskoe vozrozhdenie) and the Black Hundreds
really tried to seek votes as part of the bloc - Movement of Patriotic Forces - Russian
Deed (dvizhenie patrioticheskie sil - Russkoe Delo). The bloc reminded voters only that
the first three on the list of candidates were named Ivanov, Petrov, and Sidorov. They
received 0.17% votes.13

Putin’s Appearance and New Hope
The poor results of the 1999 campaign did not reduce the activities of the
fundamentalists. Rather, while the parliamentary elections were proceeding, they were
already preparating for the election of President Putin. It was while conducting the
propagandistic campaign that many national-patriots began to think that a change in
governmental direction could be welcomed by them.
As to the election of the president, the orthodox national-radicals were divided
among themselves.One could say that the UCR were definitely for Putin, but the Black
Hundreds and the RNU were against him. Those who were against, however, did not
urge members to vote for Zyuganov, but “against all”. Yet after the elections, in one form
12

“Monakh i voin. Beseda generala Al’berta Makashova s igumenom Aleksiem (Prosvirinnym)” [The Monk
and W ar. Conversation between General Albert Makashov with Hegumen (Abbot) Aleksei (Prosvirin)]
Rus’ Pravoslavnaia, No. 1, 1999.

13

For details on the elections of 1999, cf. Vladimir Pribylovskii, “Natsional-patrioty na vyborakh v III
Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu” ; Ekaterina Mikhailovskaia, “Itogi parlamentskikh vyborov 1999 goda dlia
natsional-patriotov (v tom chisle imperskoi napravlennosti). Otschet utoplennikov; Alexander Verkhovsky,
“Itogi parlamentskikh vyborov 1999 goda dlia radikalnykh natsional-patriotov. Odnomandatnye okruga”,
all in Natsional-patrioty. Tserkov’ i Putin. Moscow: OOO Panorama, 2000. Abbreviated English version:
Vladimir Pribylovsky, National-Patriots within the Framework of the Election for the Third State Duma;
Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, “Results of the Parliamentary Election 1999 for National-Patriots (Including
the Pro-Empire Oriented Ones). Drowning by Numbers; Alexander Verkhovsky, “Results of the
Partliamentary Election - 1999 for Radical National-Patriots. Single-Mandate Districts”; in Nationalpatriots, Church and Putin. Moscow: Center Panorama, 2001.
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or another the majority expressed their readiness to support the new president in his
proposed imperial policy.14
Putin, of course, was not ready to deal with the radical nationalists. But the tone
of the governmental propaganda did

indeed

become more authoritarian

(derzhavinicheskoi), which gave them some reason for hope. On the other hand, the
further rapprochement of the state with the ROC, which many were awaiting, did not
come about, and Putin’s Orthodoxness (pravoslavnost’) seemed unconvincing. Putin
visited monasteries more often than did Yeltsin, but that in itself does not show him to
be an Orthodox person. (There was a rumor, that archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov) was
his spiritual adviser, but there was no confirmation and the rumor died out.)

Fundamentalist Propaganda on the Rise
In recent years, the radical-nationalist movement within the Orthodox sector has
made notable changes. The basic form of radical opposition activity has traditionally
been that of propaganda. Here the larger role is played not by the simple Orthodox, but
by those in the fundamentalistic circles. No doubt this is due to their much higher
intellectual calibre, but it is also due to a greater integration into the Church.
Sretenskii monastery, headed by archimandrite Tikhon (Shekunov) transformed
itself into one of the church publishing houses and supports the fairly popular website
Pravoslavie.ru. The “Radonezh” Society publishes periodicals popular in the parishes,
and also runs a popular radio station. The most regular radical-nationalist periodical,
Russian Herald (Russkii vestnik), is also orientated toward Russian Orthodox
fundamentalism. The very active Petersburg “Zealots for Orthodox Piety” have been
producing a whole palette of publications, the basic one being the periodical Orthodox

14

For details, cf. Vladimir Pribylovsky, “Natsional-patrioty no prezidentskikh vyborakh-2000" [Nationalpatriots in the Presidential Election of 2000]; and “Otnoshenie natsional-patriotov k Putinu posle 26 marta”
[Relationship of National Patriots to Putin after March 26]; in Natsional-patrioty, Tserkov’ i Putin.
Moscow, OOO Panorama, 2000. Abbreviated English version: Vladimir Pribylovsky, “National-Patriots
at the Presidential Election 2000"; “The Attitude of National-Patriots towards Vladimir Putin in the
Aftermath of March 26, 2000"; in National-patriots, Church and Putin. Moscow: Center Panorama, 2001.
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Rus (Rus’ Pravoslavnaia) and the website Russian Line (Russkaia liniia). (In general,
the fundamentalists are very active on the internet.)
In addition, the fundamentalists are carrying forth their offensive not only in
secular society, but also within the Church. The views of the fundamentalists are, of
course, not those of the Patriarch, but they are widespread among the clergy and laity of
the church, since there is often a nostalgia for lost status. Moreover, we are not speaking
here of a natural conservatism, since the mindset of these persons is predominantly that
of neophytes of the last 10-15 years. The poverty (and guilt) of the Patriarchate lies in the
fact that it did not at the time give a sharp enough rebuff to the rise of fundamentalism
in the church. Now, quite possibly, it is already too late.15
The sharpest attack on the fundamentalists came in the speech of Patriarch
Alexsei II at the Moscow bishops conference of December 23, 1998, resulting in the
resolution of the Synod on “junior elders” (mladostartsakh). Although no one was named
specifically, it was clear to all that the speech was directed at fundamentalistic priests.16
While this was happening,17 there began in autumn of 1999 a massive campaign, though
smaller than a year earlier, against the barcodes and the INN (individual tax number),
about which more below.
The canonization of the tsarist family at the Jubilee Sobor in August 2000
signaled an apparent defeat of the Patriarchate in the face of powerful pressures from
below.18 The Patriarchate had dragged out the question for many years, and then, when
15

For a survey of the relations between the Patriarchate and the fundamentalists till the end of 1998, see
Alexander Verkhovsky, “Tserkov v politike i politika v Tserkvi”, 65-100.

16

The themes of the resolution on “Junior Elders” accused them very broadly of politicization and
opposition to the Patriarchy. The “Junior Elders” were guilty of carrying out their pastoral tasks poorly,
and under rating the wishes of their spiritual children. Incidentally, the list of charges were similar to those
usually applied to “totalitarian sects”. cf. http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/sr291281.htm

17

The situation was described by one of the known “zealots”, Hegumen Aleksei (Prosvirin). “Krestonostsy”
[Cross-bearers], Rus’ Pravoslavnaia, No. 7, 1999.

18

For an assessment of the event: Aleksandr Kvrlezhev, “Iubileleinyi Arkhiereiskii Sobor Russkoi
Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi” [Jubilee Bishops Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church], Russkaia m ysl’, August
31, 2000; Maxim Shevchenko, Oleg Nedumov, Elena Smirnova, “Tserkov’ kanonizirovala poslednego
tsaria” [The Church Canonized the Last Tsar], Nezavisim aia gazeta, August 15, 2000.
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it yielded in the end, not wanting the disagreements to become an open scandal, this
filled the fundamentalists with optimism. Moreover, they continued to call Nicholas II
a saint, quite rightly, although the Sobor canonized him at a different rank - as passion
bearer.19 That is, even on this question there was no reconciliation.
The Patriarchate continued its policy of contradictory compromises. Two years
after the speech on “junior elders”, during a regular Moscow bishops conference, the
Patriarch complained that the problem had in no way been resolved. But then, literally
two weeks later on January 10, 2001, he sent a letter of congratulation to the radical
national Orthodox periodical Russian Herald (Russkii vestnik) on its tenth anniversary.
Nor does the quality of staff changes within the Patriarchate enable us to draw
conclusions about any change in its policies. Recent examples are the appointment in
July 2001 of archpriest Dimitri Smirnov as acting chair of the Moscow Patriarchate’s
department for cooperation with the military and judicial branches, and the August
(2001) appointment of Sergei Chapnin as editor in chief of the patriarchal periodical
Moscow Church Herald (Moskovskii tserkovnyi vestnik).
Chapnin, an independent Orthodox journalist, had been supporting the liberals,
from the point of view of the church. Until very recently he was the editor in chief of the
independent internet journal Sobornost’.20
Archpriest Dimitrii, on the other hand, was the spiritual leader of a group of
fundamentalist oriented priests in Moscow. Here are some excerpts from his recent radio
broadcasts:
“Take for example in Moscow - are there not enough bricks to smash all the
sexshops? But so far no one has so much as smashed a window of such an establishment.
... Or take the example of the sects. Suppose that say 800 people would chase out

19

For details see, Aleksandr Kvrlezhev, “Utverditsia li v Rossii novaia eres’?” [A New Heresy in Russia
Confirmed?] NG-Religii. November 15, 2000; Andrei Voitovskii, “Pravoslavnye izdaniia o tsare i
Rasputine” [ Orthodox Publication on the Tsar and Rasputin], NG-Religii, November 29, 2000.

20

Now the journal has ceased publication. Cf. http://www.sobor.ru

28

the sects. To disperse a crowd of 800 - how many police do you need? And then, no
prefect nor any other official likes it, that the people revolt.
... progress also has its shadow side. Had they not invented jet airplanes, no one
would have smashed into a strange building, people would not have died... They say: “I
need to fly there!” But why fly there? You live in your village, and that’s it. Twice a year
you go to the market - that’s enough.”21

Politicization of “Moralism” as Legal Manifestation of Fundamentalism
Before his recent appointment, archpriest Dimitrii played no more than a marginal
role in the church, just like Dushenov or Grigor’ev above. As prorector of the St. Tikhon
Theological Institute and closely tied to the Orthodox medical-educational center Life
(Zhizn) of Father Maksim Obukhov, he headed the struggle against abortion,
contraception, etc. The Patriarchate did not simply condemn these activities, rather it
supported them fully. The unique feature of the organized moralists in the Life center and
of the public committee For the Moral Revival of the Fatherland (Za nravstvennoe
vozrozhdenie Otechestva) of archprient Alexander Shargunov lay in the fact that their
propaganda was coordinated with politics and ideology.22
For example, the church-societal council for biomedical ethics, that was
associated with the Life center, in a statement of April 2, 2001, on the demographic
problems, based its concerns on the grounds that “that we will soon no longer be in a
position to defend our territory”.23 Father Aleksei Kagirin, one of the prominent activists

21

“Prot. Dimitrii Smirnov otvechaet v priamom efire na voprosy slushatelei” [Father Dimitrii Smirnov
answers q uestio ns d irectly o n radio] (efir rad io ‘R ad o nezh’ o t 17 .0 9 .0 1 ;
http://www.radonezh.orthodoxy.ru/news_text.asp?id_news=3208)

22

See for example, the sixth collection of Antikhrist v Moskve [Antichrist in Moscow] by the Shargunov
Committee. This one, as well as other materials circulated by the committee are accessible at their website:
http://komitee.chat.ru; for details on the activities of the moralists see Alexander Verkhovsky, “Tserkov
v politike i politika v Tserkvi”, 96-97.

23

“Tserkovno-obshchestvennyi sovet po bioetike pri Moskovskoi Patriarkhii vystupil s zaiavleniem” [The
Church-Societal Council for Bioethics of the Moscow Patriarchate Makes a Statement] Strana.Ru
07.04.2001(http://www.old.strana.ru/society/religion/2001/04/07/986642314.html).
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of the “moralist” movement stated the following:
“The word “Kike” (Zhid) refers to those persons who hate Christ.
One could abstract from contemporary Judaism and imagine a Jew, who
knows nothing about Christ - such a Jew (Iudei) would not be a Kike
(Zhid).”24
In the past five years, politicized moralism became an integral part of
fundamentalist activity, together with the denouncing of ecumenism, opposing secular
and churchly authorities and with nationalist propaganda. Here we see the basis for
cooperation with the non-churchly radical-nationalists.
On March 20, 2001, for example, in the Kuzminki Park in Moscow the RNU, the
Union of Orthodox Bannerbearers, the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods and the Union
of the Russian People conducted a new Auto d’a Fé. They burned a broad assortment of
items: the journal Playboy, the neopagan book by V. Istarkhov, The Stroke of the
Russian Gods (Udar Russkikh Bogov), Sexual Encyclopedia for Children, the books
of Edward Radzinskii and Mikhail Gorbachev, the periodical Moscow Komsomolets, and
pornographic videocassettes. Those gathered called for the adoption of the law “On
Spiritual and Moral Censorship”.25

Union of Orthodox Citizens(UOC)
“Life” is in fact one of the projects of the Union of Orthodox Citizens (UOC) a broad coalition of Orthodox nationalists. It is so broad that its participants are
practically incompatible in quality and degree of radicalism, including for example, the
economist Sergei Glaz’ev (one time member of the Gaidar Cabinet, now a deputy of the
CPRF) and the leader of the UCR, Vladimir Osipov.26

24

A. Kagirin, sviashchennik. “Nenavidiashchie siona” [Zion-haters] Russkii vestnik, No. 7, 1999.

25

“Natsional-patrioty ustroili autodafe v Kuz’minkakh” [National-patriots made an Auto d’a Fé in
Kuz’minke], Mir religii. 20.03.2001

26

On the formation and activities of the UOC till spring of 1999 see Alexander Verkhovsky, “Tserkov’ v
politike i politika v Tserkvi”, 106-107.
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The UOC, in spite of its motley staff, retains a completely friendly relationship
with the Patriarchate. We cite only one illustration. On June 11, 2001 on the occasion of
presenting the Church’s order of the holy saint Prince Daniil III of Moscow to Valentin
Lebedev, the coordinator of UOC and editor in chief of Orthodox Conversations
(Pravoslavnaia Beseda), journalist Natalia Babasian observed a somewhat comic scene.
On the eve of organizing a church procession in Kiev against the papal visit to the
Ukraine, Valentin Lebedev announced to Metropolitan Kirill (Gundiaev), chair of the
department of foreign relations of the Moscow Patriarchy, “We carried out your charge”.
In answer, Metropolitan Kirill merely said that “about that there is no need to speak
before the TV cameras.”27
The fundamentalism of the UOC is less extreme than that of the Black Hundreds
or UCR, but is fully consistent:
“The nation, in contrast to the contemporary secular state, may be considered
Orthodox.
... Not to recognize the fact, that a country where there are many Orthodox must
be declared Orthodox, is discrimination on the basis of religious confession.” 28
“The boundaries of Rus extend as far as the boundaries of the Russian Orthodox
Church.” 29
“In the present time, this governmental chaos can lead only to a dictatorship, one
based on moral and national consciousness, on state prerequisites.” Further, such a
dictatorship must develop into a full fledged autocracy.30
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Nataliia Babasian, “Dlinnaia ruka iz-pod omofora” [The long reach from under the Ohmmeter] Grani.Ru
12.06.2001 (http://grani.ru:8101/denominations/articles/protests/)
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Cited from Mikhail Sitnikov, “Soiuz grazhdan pravoslavnoi natsional’nosti” [Union of Citizens of
Orthodox Nationality], Russkaia m ysl’, 19-25.02.1998.
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Kirill Frolov, press-sekretar’ Soiuza pravoslavnykh grazhdan. “Mirotochivaia ikona tsaria muchenika”
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Prot. Vladislav Sveshnikov, “Ob INN I ne tol’ko” [On the INN but not only] Strana.Ru. 25.03.2001
(http://old.strana.ru/society/religion/2001/03/25/985520648.html). Father Vladislav is spiritual confessor
to UOC.
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“Never before were the European West and America set so openly hostile against
Russia, as now.”31
Many UOC activists voted in the parliamentary elections of 1999, but generally
without success, since only Sergei Glazev, who was not that tightly integrated into the
union, got elected. Instead eveyone noted that Valentin Lebedev himself and still another
activist, Viktor Selivanov, editor in chief of the periodical Desnitsa, appeared on the lists
of the Bloc “Spas”, which was founded by the RNU, and the first on that list was
Alexander Barkashov. Such action by the chief editor of the nonpolitical Orthodox
Conversations (Pravoslavnoi Besedy) looked most unusual, but it is too circumstantial
to be considered fundamental.32
Such electoral losses were quickly compensated for with powerful public
campaigns (UOC gained support through such a campaign - against showing the film The
Last Temptation of Christ). Until August of 2000 the UOC fought actively for the
canonization of the tsarist family. Then in spring and in June 2001 they carried out a
massive campaign against the Pope’s visit to the Ukraine. On December 26, 2000 during
the break there took place the founding conference of UOC as independent public
movement.
Then on May 12, 2000 the UOC together with the LDPR, but also with the
participation of the movements - Orthodox Russia (Rossia Pravoslavnaia), Union of
Orthodox Brotherhoods, Union of Orthodox Bannerbearers, Union of Christian Revival
plus other organizations - conducted an anti-papal march with 1500 marchers (so the
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For details on the campaign see Aleksandr Verkhovskii, “Religioznyi faktor v parlamentskoi kampanii
1999 goda”, National-patrioty, Tserkov’ i Putin. Moscow, OOO Panorama, 2000. For English
Translation: Alexander Verkhovsky, “Religious Factor in the Parliamentary Election Campaign of 1999",
National-patriots, Church and Putin. Moscow: Center Panorama, 2001.
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estimate of the police).33 For Orthodox nationalists, those are very large numbers.
During this same period the UOC and the Sretensky monastery began to initiate
close relations with the main pro-Kremlin propagandistic web-server Strana.Ru, whose
religious department became the mouthpiece of the funamentalists. But then at the end
of August the department was closed entirely and the cooperation was broken off.

Orthodox Anti-globalism...
The main societal campaign, however, which had unfolded rather broadly in the
fall of 1999 and continued a bit more quietly during the summer of 2001, were the wave
of protests against the commercial bar code and the assigning of an identification number
to taxpayers, the introduction of machine readable signatures in future passports and
other such measures which, it would seem, had no special principled significance. The
personal tax number (individualnyii nomer nalogoplatel’shchika - INN) became the
symbol and bugbear of the campaign.
For the full details for what Grigor’ev aptly named the “INN Jihad”, see my paper
“Radical Orthodox Anti-Globalism in 1999-2002".34 It contains a short description of the
chain of events before the artificial calm in the summer of 2001. The essence of the
campaign concerned not only the fostering of amazing prejudices, but also of the
formation of a specific conception of Orthodox anti-globalism, in which the West once
again appeared as the mysterious enemy of Russian Orthodoxy. The more moderate antiglobalists were prepared to ignore such “technical” problems as the introduction of the
INN numbers, but the radicals insisted on drawing the line here, for a resistance unto
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Soobshchenie OVTsS. 11.05.2001 (http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr105111.htm) It is worth
noting that it is a rare and hence significant event, when the OVTsS (Department for Foreign Relations of
the Moscow Patriarchate) in a sympathetically neutral tone gives information on the activities of such a
group, like the UOBB and UCR.
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The paper was presented at a seminar “Christian Fundamentalism, Racism and Antisemitism”, in
University of Sussex, April 10, 2002. Further details in Maksim Shevchenko, “Apokalipsis segodnia.”
[Apocalypse today] NGR. 17.01.2001; Aleksandr Verkhovskii, “Problema INN grozit raskolom ne
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death.35
Important for us is that the “INN Jihad” pulled in practically all Orthodox
oriented groups, yes even a wide circle of monks, who in recent years have constituted
the basic bulwark of fundamentalism in the Church. The more educated in Orthodoxy
that this or that group was, the more moderate was the position they took. So for example
the RNU published a leaflet in which they devised quite bizarre things - some mole
would insert into the barcode “all the data about you, even the most intimate”.36
In so doing, the radicals responded to the arguments of the theologians, bishops
and even respected elders (Startsy) with the elegant argument: “we need to defend our
real needs, not our idealist and spiritual needs.”37
On the other hand, the “INN Jihad” demonstrated, that among the Orthodox
nationalists there existed not only an intellectual leadership, but that it had moved from
non-church groups to inner-church groups.
Thus the resultant balance between the moderates and radicals was not entirely
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On the positions of the moderates, see Arkhimandrit Tikhon (Shevkunov), “Vystuplenie v peredache
“R ad o nezh” 2 9 .0 1 .2 0 0 1 " [ Statement on R ad io R ad o nezh] P ra vo sla vie.R u
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of Optina Pustyn to Orthodox Christians] Rus’ Pravoslavnaia. No. 1, 2001; “Globalizatsiia i lichnye kody
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clear. It would seem that the moderates won out through a resolution of the Theological
Commission of the ROC.38 They had already worked for some time on a document
representing the ROC, which was approved at the conference “Spiritual and Social
Problems of Globalization” (May 3-4, 2001.). Yet it looked acceptable enough for both
the fundamentalists and for the Patriarchate.39

...And Its Potential
But the radical fundamentalists were in no way routed. The campaign against the
INN elicited activists “among the people”, till then unknown, such as Konstantin
Gordeev, editor in chief of the periodical Holy Rus (Sviataia Rus’, formerly Serbskii
krest.) Above all, this campaign managed to bring society as a whole to comprehend the
fundamentalist ideas for the first time as points for general national consideration
(compare this with the problem of the canonization of Nikolai II which was debated in
society mostly as a political matter). Then over time the campaign moved all of the
Orthodox nationalists out of their traditionally marginal status.
It is of course not obvious, how they will manage to build on their success.
Currently there is a consolidation of the positions of the moderate Orthodox antiglobalists, which to some extent is due to the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate. On
the other hand, the anti-Western and antiglobalist tones brought forth by the attack on
USA on September 11, a sentiment sufficiently widespread in Russia, may give the
radical-nationalists new stimulus. Thus far much depends on which groups will play the
more active role in the ideological maneuvers inside the Church.
One must keep in mind, that the arguments of the radical fundamentalists have
the advantage, that they, like most radical systems, are internally very logical and tend
toward simple and clear answers. When one of the radical ideologists, archdeacon Avel’
38

Summary document of the enlarged meeting of the Theological Commission of the ROC February 19-20,
2001. Cf. Http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr102206.htm)
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(Semenov), shows throughout his book40, that globalization is antireligious and, that
therefore “no compromise with it is possible”, it sounds sensible, much more so than the
proposals of archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov), initiator of the many campaigns against
the barcode. Archdeacon Avel’ pays scant attention to the INN or the barcode, but
protests against globalization as a whole.
There remain, of course, non-church nationalists, for whom the arguments of the
radical fundamentalists sound too churchy, and there are the church nationalists, for
whom these arguments sound too extreme with reference to the present church. We do
not really expect the triumph of the radical fundamentalists. But with their “INN Jihad”
they have already changed the ideological landscape of Orthodox nationalism.

[translated by Walter Sawatsky, 06/02]
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